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Abstract 
To succeed, political science usually requires either prediction or contextual historical 
work. Both of these methods favor explanations that are narrow-scope, applying to only 
one or a few cases. Because of the difficulty of prediction, the main focus of political 
science should often be contextual historical work. These epistemological conclusions 
follow from the ubiquity of causal fragility, under-determination, and noise. They tell 
against several practices that are widespread in the discipline: wide-scope retrospective 
testing, such as much large-n statistical work; lack of emphasis on prediction; and 
resources devoted to ‘pure theory’ divorced from frequent empirical application. I 
illustrate, via Donatella della Porta’s work on political violence, the important role that is 
still left for theory. I conclude by assessing the scope for political science to offer policy 
advice. 
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1. Introduction and main claims 
What methods are appropriate for political science?1 I argue for prediction and contextual 
historical work, and that these two methods each favor narrow-scope explanations. The 
arguments apply to field sciences generally, but I concentrate on political science.2 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in this section, I state some basic distinctions and 
then my main theses and targets. In section 2, I make the case for what has been called 
‘scientific prediction’. In sections 3 to 7, I examine the implications for scientific 
prediction of a series of methodological challenges, namely underdetermination, causal 
fragility, and noise. In section 8, I discuss what role is left for theory, and in section 9, I 
illustrate this role via an example. Finally, in section 10, I consider the scope for political 
science to offer policy advice. 
 
1.1 Different types of prediction 
The word ‘prediction’ is ambiguous. Two distinctions are important: 
 
1) Forward-looking prediction: predictions about future data; versus  
Retrospective prediction: predictions about past data. 
 
2) Simple prediction: the attempt simply to predict future or past outcomes; versus 
Scientific prediction: the attempt to empirically test particular theories or models.  
Often, scientific prediction concerns the impact of varying just one focal variable, 
holding other variables constant or in some other way controlling for confounders. 
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Scientific prediction may also concern conditional predictions, such as what will happen 
if a policy-maker intervenes in a certain way. 
 
I borrow the term ‘scientific prediction’ from Dowding and Miller (2019).3 Dowding and 
Miller discuss only the second of the above distinctions explicitly, although they 
implicitly nod to the first distinction as well by defining non-scientific prediction to 
encompass only forward-looking prediction. I keep the two distinctions distinct. 
 
To clarify the relations between the different kinds of prediction: first, scientific 
prediction is a subset of simple prediction. A simple prediction is in addition scientific 
only if it concerns data gathered in certain epistemologically propitious conditions, 
namely those conditions suitable for testing a theory or model. Second, scientific 
prediction, and simple prediction generally, can be either forward-looking or 
retrospective. Retrospective simple prediction is just description of the past. 
 
1.2 Different types of explanation 
There is a difference of degree between: 
Wide-scope explanations, which apply to many cases; versus  
Narrow-scope explanations, which are very local or contextual and that, in the limit, may 
apply only to a single case.4 
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An explanation might or might not be derived from a theory or model (section 8). 
Theories and models themselves vary in scope, but what matters for our purposes is the 
scope of explanations (section 8). 
 
Throughout, I have in mind causal explanations. This is not because I rule out other kinds 
of explanation but rather is because causal explanations are the kind of explanation 
usually offered in political science.5 For the most part, the relevant models are causal too. 
 
1.3 Main theses 
I argue that, in political science:  
Thesis 1) While any kind of prediction is desirable, scientific prediction is especially so. 
Thesis 2) Usually, the purpose of scientific prediction is fulfilled only by forward-looking 
prediction or by contextual historical work. 
Thesis 3) Usually, narrow-scope explanation is favored. 
 
1.4 Targets 
Some widespread practices in political science fall foul of the above theses: 
1) A lack of emphasis on forward-looking prediction. 
2) Forward-looking predictions, when they are made, being wide-scope. 
3) Wide-scope retrospective testing, such as much large-n statistical work. 
4) Resources being devoted to ‘pure theory’, in other words devoted to building up a 
repertoire of wide-scope models divorced from frequent empirical application. 
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2. Scientific prediction is desirable 
Causal knowledge is central to political science, as it is to most sciences, because it is the 
key to explanation, intervention and extrapolation. The standard template for causal 
inference is to change one variable while keeping all else equal. Scientific prediction 
typically concerns the results of just such changes, and therefore delivers causal 
knowledge.  
 
Simple prediction, by contrast, is concerned purely with actual outcomes, which in field 
environments are typically the result of many different variables varying all at once. 
Therefore, simple predictions that are non-scientific do not deliver causal knowledge 
even when accurate. Thus, Thesis 1: Scientific prediction is especially desirable. 
 
Confirmation of theory is useful for purposes other than causal inference too (Dowding 
and Miller 2019). Therefore, because it is the means to get confirmation of theory, 
scientific prediction is useful for these other purposes too. 
 
 
3. Underdetermination 
Suppose that candidate X wins an election. There are likely many plausible explanations 
of why X won. This creates a problem of underdetermination: the mere occurrence of the 
same headline fact, namely that X won, cannot by itself discriminate between the many 
different explanations of that fact. This problem is likely to be especially acute if an 
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explanandum is qualitative, as when we seek to explain merely who won an election 
rather than by exactly how much. But even in quantitative cases, as when we seek to 
explain X’s margin of victory, the bar is often lowered, because only a partial or 
approximate fit with the data is demanded: a model may be endorsed even though it 
‘explains’ only some but not all of the relevant variation.6 Such a lowered bar might be 
cleared by many models, and so the underdetermination problem remains. 
 
One solution to underdetermination is forward-looking prediction. If you have to stick 
your neck out in advance, that removes the possibility of fudging awkward outcomes 
after the fact.7 Many models or pundits might be able to explain the outcome of one 
election, even of five elections, relatively plausibly. But few are able to predict five 
correctly in advance. Lucky guesses, although possible of one election, are much less 
likely of five, especially if the target of prediction is quantitative. Insisting that accurate 
prediction be forward-looking discriminates between competing models more effectively 
than does allowing accurate prediction to be retrospective.8 
 
Logically speaking, indefinitely many models fit any given body of evidence. But 
methodologically speaking, the key issue is whether those different models, in addition to 
being logically possible, are also plausible or to be taken seriously. It is at this 
methodological level that the confirmational asymmetry between forward-looking and 
retrospective prediction carries bite.9 
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4. Contextual historical work 
Forward-looking prediction is not the only solution to the underdetermination problem. A 
second solution is if there are no plausible alternative explanations, in which case the 
mere fact of retrospective fit is decisive: if no other plausible theory or model can 
accommodate the past evidence then the fact that your model can tells strongly in its 
favor. In political science though, this situation applies only rarely. It is hard to prove this 
claim in a non-anecdotal way but, as with the election example, in political science there 
are usually many plausible explanations after the fact (Dowding 2016). 
 
A third solution to the underdetermination problem is more promising: we may gather 
additional evidence that favors one explanation over others (Northcott 2019a).10 If so, 
there is no need to rely on forward-looking prediction to break an epistemic tie. 
Additional evidence may favor, say, one explanation of an election result over others. 
This evidence might take the form of post-election interviews of voters, or of 
comparisons of vote shares in different districts cross-referenced by potentially 
explanatory demographic and economic variables.  
 
Happily, gathering such additional evidence is usually possible.11 It is what historians do 
all the time. Such additional evidence is often idiographic; that is, it often concerns causal 
relations that are sui generis and local. The explanations that result thus tend to be 
specific to the particular case, appealing to local details. So, contextual historical work 
leads to narrow-scope explanations. Sui generis local details are typically not included in 
wide-scope models or theories, which seek to capture factors that recur across contexts.  
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Thus, combining this and the previous section, Thesis 2: Usually, the purpose of 
scientific prediction is fulfilled only by forward-looking prediction or by contextual 
historical work. We therefore face a choice: either to make forward-looking predictions, 
or else to engage in historian-like detailed sifting of the evidence. 
 
Thus, also, one ‘half’ of Thesis 3: Usually, contextual historical work favors narrow-
scope explanations. (For why forward-looking prediction does too, see section 5 below.) 
 
This endorsement of contextual historical work brings with it a challenge: is reliable 
causal inference possible in singular historical cases? The ubiquity of historical 
controversies suggests that the problem of underdetermination is still present. Formal 
techniques of causal inference, such as experiments or statistical analysis, are usually 
inapplicable. In reply, how skeptical do you want to be? Take Holocaust denial, which 
implies a denial of many singular causal claims. Setting aside the ugly moral and political 
dimensions, the skepticism behind Holocaust denial is untenably extreme 
epistemologically, at least with respect to many basic facts of the case. Total skepticism 
with respect to mundane causal inferences about individual human actions or the social 
world, is similarly extreme: such inferences are, like observation itself, although fallible, 
usually reliable. Historians’ causal inferences, usually backed up by copious archival and 
other evidence, and by well-supported background knowledge, are just extensions of 
these everyday procedures. 
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Some historical controversies do persist nevertheless. If, after contextual historical work, 
it remains underdetermined which explanation is correct, then the only epistemic tie-
breaker left is forward-looking prediction: which explanation’s predictions are borne out? 
Often, this tie-breaker is unavailable, perhaps because the relevant events occurred long 
ago. If so, we are stuck: we must concede that we do not know which explanation is 
correct. 
 
Total skepticism about narrow-scope historical causal inference would negate this 
section’s argument for narrow-scope explanation. (I present other arguments for narrow-
scope explanation shortly.) A more reasonable partial skepticism leaves the endorsement 
of contextual historical work less widely applicable rather than negated, and therefore 
this section’s argument for narrow-scope explanation also less widely applicable. What is 
at stake is whether contextual historical work can obviate the need for forward-looking 
prediction when confirming an explanation. When forward-looking prediction is very 
difficult, as it often is (section 6), what is at stake is therefore whether political science 
can succeed. If we deny the possibility of narrow-scope historical causal inference, we 
deny most of political science. 
 
 
5. Causal fragility 
Consider, for a moment, an example from physics. Coulomb’s Law describes the 
electrostatic force between charged particles. Although a particular charged particle’s 
trajectory may not be predicted accurately by Coulomb’s Law because of the presence of 
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other forces, Coulomb’s Law does identify one of the forces present, and so it does 
explain the charged particle’s motion partially.12 How is this explanatory claim 
warranted? By the predictive success of Coulomb’s Law in a different context, namely a 
laboratory experiment, combined with a stability assumption that the causal relation 
demonstrated in the other context is still present in our context (Cartwright 1989).  
 
Label the opposite of such causal stability, causal fragility. It tells against wide-scope 
explanations twice over. 
 
The first reason is metaphysical: causal fragility means that causal relations themselves 
are not wide-scope. Therefore, explanations based on those causal relations likewise 
cannot be wide-scope.13  
 
The second reason is epistemological: if causal relations are fragile, then even if 
empirical warrant is achieved in one context, fresh empirical warrant is required again for 
each new context. Empirical warrant can no longer be deferred; it must be prioritized 
continuously. A wide-scope explanation cannot automatically be imported, in the manner 
of Coulomb’s Law, on the back of success in other contexts. A model’s claim to have 
identified a causal relation in the field is not established by that model’s empirical 
success in the laboratory. 
 
Thus, if causal fragility is usual in political science, then Thesis 3: Usually, narrow-scope 
explanation is favored. 
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Causal relations are often stable in sciences such as laboratory physics, Coulomb’s Law 
being a paradigm example. What about in field sciences such as political science? Any 
answer is inevitably somewhat anecdotal, but it seems that in field sciences causal 
relations are indeed usually fragile: they tend not to generalize easily.  
 
Consider political elections. The causal relations between demographic variables and 
voter preference change from election to election, and even during elections and between 
different regions. The causal relations between demographic variables and voter 
enthusiasm change frequently too, as do those between economic variables and election 
outcomes, and between likelihood to vote and answers about that to opinion pollsters 
(Northcott 2019b). 
 
Field scientists’ own practice often implicitly assumes that causes are fragile. A famous 
study showed that, in one circumstance, raising the minimum wage increases 
employment (Card and Krueger 1994). But in other circumstances, it does not: say, when 
the minimum wage is already very high, when it is raised by a large amount, or when 
economic conditions are different. In response, crucially, rather than search for 
countervailing causes that outweigh the original employment-increasing one, instead 
researchers just assume that the original employment-increasing cause no longer obtains 
(Reiss 2008, 173-6). This response is arguably typical in economics, and it implicitly 
assumes causal fragility. 
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Causal fragility extends beyond just the social sciences. It is arguably typical of ecology 
(Elliott-Graves 2018, Sagoff 2016), of field biology more widely (Dupré 2012), and of 
data science too (Pietsch 2016). In complex systems generally, an explanation that works 
today often does not work tomorrow. A significant predictor of causal fragility seems to 
be just that we are in a context of unshielded field phenomena. 
 
Further evidence for the ubiquity of causal fragility is the ubiquity of the problem of 
external validity. In social science, external validity can rarely if ever be assumed (Levitt 
and List 2007; Reiss 2008, 92-6): results from laboratory experiments are notoriously 
unreliable in the field, presumably because of the huge range of new contextual cues and 
inputs in a field environment. In other words, causal relations discovered in the 
laboratory are fragile. Again, scientists’ own practice often implicitly concedes the point. 
When field operation of a mechanism really needs to be ensured, extensive contextual 
testing and simulation is demanded, as in the design of the US government auctions of 
electromagnetic spectrum in the 1990s (Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and Northcott 
2009). 
 
Similar remarks apply not just to external validity but also to extrapolation generally. The 
causal relations underpinning policy interventions or field trials in one context typically 
cannot just be assumed to carry over to another; they are too fragile for that (Cartwright 
2019, Khosrowi 2019, Cartwright and Hardie 2012, Steel 2008). 
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6. Noise 
A familiar difficulty in field sciences is to distinguish signal from noise. Unshielded 
environments are typically ‘noisy’ in the sense that it is hard to isolate the impact of one 
factor alone. A model might posit that X causes Y, so to test the model we must measure 
the impact of X on Y. But if other factors A, B, and C also impact on Y, then scientific 
prediction is more challenging than simply predicting Y after a change in X, because we 
need to shield off or control for the influence of A, B, and C too.14 In field settings, such 
shielding off is difficult, and therefore so is scientific prediction.  
 
Political science is not a laboratory science; it is concerned with noisy, unshielded field 
environments, and so scientific prediction is difficult. There are some well-known 
workarounds. One is natural experiments, when processes outside the investigator’s 
control happen to divide a sample into treatment and control groups in the same way that 
an experimenter would have. Others include quasi-experiments, randomized field trials 
and laboratory experiments (Northcott 2019a). For the many occasions when experiments 
are not possible, an array of statistical techniques have been developed to try to infer 
causes from non-experimental data. These various workarounds have different strengths 
and weaknesses, but they all share two serious difficulties. The first difficulty is scope: 
practical and ethical limitations mean there is only a limited range of political questions 
that experiments can usefully elucidate, while statistical methods require large samples 
and so are difficult to apply to explanatory claims that are narrow-scope. The second 
difficulty is external validity (section 5): only rarely do causal inferences from an 
experimental or other context extrapolate reliably to a new context.  
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The problem of noise therefore has several consequences. First, scientific prediction can 
be achieved only by forward-looking rather than retrospective prediction. In a shielded 
environment, matters can be set up so that only one (salient) model or theory is under 
test, as in controlled experiments, thereby overcoming the problem of 
underdetermination, thereby enabling retrospective scientific prediction. But political 
science rarely concerns shielded environments. Neither can statistical surrogates often fill 
the gap. Thus, retrospective scientific prediction cannot be achieved, and the first disjunct 
of Thesis 2 is reaffirmed: forward-looking prediction is favored. 
 
Second, because forward-looking scientific prediction is difficult, usually we must fall 
back on the second disjunct of Thesis 2, namely contextual historical work, which in turn 
(section 4) favors narrow-scope explanations. Thus, Thesis 3: usually, narrow-scope 
explanation is favored. 
 
Third, narrow-scope explanation is favored via another route too. Wide-scope 
explanations inevitably miss sui generis local causal relations, and so typically identify 
only some of the causal relations present in a given field situation. There is no shame in 
that: in noisy environments, such partial explanations are often the best that can be hoped 
for. But a partial explanation requires empirical warrant just like any other explanation, 
and given such explanations’ empirical inaccuracy this warrant must be imported from 
empirical success elsewhere. Applications of Coulomb’s Law outside the laboratory, for 
example, import warrant from the Law’s empirical success inside the laboratory. Causal 
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fragility threatens this ‘imported warrant’ strategy because empirical warrant from 
elsewhere may not travel (section 5). The ubiquitous difficulty that noise creates for 
accurate scientific prediction now threatens the ‘imported warrant’ strategy in a new way: 
it is likely that there is no full empirical success anywhere, and thus no empirical warrant 
anywhere available to be imported. There is no analogue of the successful Coulomb 
laboratory experiment (Northcott 2017, MS). 
 
To illustrate the difficulty: many competing models seek to explain election results. 
Suppose that one model says election results are caused by GDP growth in the preceding 
year. In any actual election, likely many other factors too are causally relevant, so the 
GDP model will be explanatory at best only partially. If we could somehow tweak a 
polity so that only GDP was altered and then see how this tweak impacted an election 
result, then we could test the GDP model and only that model. Obviously, such an 
election experiment is impossible: which is precisely the point. Because of noise, there is 
no successful scientific prediction anywhere, either in the context at hand or in other 
contexts. The GDP model’s partial explanation is left without warrant (Northcott 2015).15 
 
The only solution is empirical accuracy in the case at hand. In a noisy environment with 
many ever-changing and sui generis causal relations, this implies a causal description – 
and thus an explanation – that is narrow-scope.16 
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Overall, the problem of noise therefore provides new support for Thesis 2: either 
forward-looking prediction or contextual historical work is required. It also provides new 
support, in two ways, for Thesis 3: narrow-scope explanation is favored. 
 
The problem of noise is closely related to the problem of overfitting. In fields such as 
machine learning and statistics, a model normally has a number of free parameters, which 
leaves considerable flexibility when fitting the model to data. The problem of overfitting 
is that tweaking parameter values to ensure maximal fit with every idiosyncratic detail of 
past data often reduces predictive accuracy with respect to future data. How close a fit, 
then, should we aim for? It is hard to know. At root, overfitting is an underdetermination 
problem caused by noise: because data are noisy, a precise fit with a model is 
implausible.  
 
A standard solution to overfitting is to test competing models on data not used in those 
models’ formulation or calibration. If free parameters must be fixed in advance of this 
testing, then ‘cheating’ is made impossible, i.e. the free parameters cannot be adjusted to 
fit outcomes after the fact.  
 
This solution is effective. But because the data used to test between competing models 
need only be independent of model estimation, there is no necessity for the relevant 
predictions to be forward-looking. Does this solution therefore undercut Thesis 2, which 
favors forward-looking over retrospective prediction? No. If an explanation is narrow-
scope, then usually there is not a large stock of relevant past data available, and so the 
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only predictions available for countering overfitting are forward-looking ones. In political 
science, successful explanations usually are indeed narrow-scope. Therefore, in political 
science Thesis 2’s favoring of forward-looking over retrospective scientific prediction is 
(usually) endorsed. 
 
 
7. Laboratory versus field sciences 
Laboratory sciences avoid the problems discussed in this paper. Shielded, controlled 
experiments avoid the underdetermination and noise problems, and the causal relations 
that laboratory sciences deal with seem to be less fragile.17 As a result, wide-scope 
theories and models succeed empirically, as do wide-scope explanations derived from 
them. Retrospective prediction is sufficient. Explanations derived from Newtonian force 
models are a paradigm case: they are wide-scope and they can be satisfactorily tested by 
retrospective evidence.  
 
Just the opposite is true of field sciences: the problems of underdetermination and noise 
are not avoided, and causes tend to be fragile. As a result, forward-looking prediction is 
favored. If forward-looking prediction is too difficult, then only contextual historical 
work will do. Only narrow-scope explanations succeed. Theses 2 and 3 apply. And they 
apply to political science because political science is predominantly a field science. 
 
 
8. The role of theory 
 18 
A hallmark of science is that it has ambition beyond singular explanations: it also aims 
for wide-scope theory. But if forward-looking scientific prediction is usually infeasible 
because of noise and causal fragility, then usually we must turn to contextual historical 
work, for which, in unshielded field environments, wide-scope theory is ill-suited. What 
role, then, can be salvaged for theory? 
 
We should not be blinded by famous physics: not all theories are universal regularities 
written in mathematical form. Theoretical work in political science is better understood 
via the toolbox view, according to which theories are individual items in an overall 
repertoire or toolbox. No theory is thought to apply universally or across a whole sample, 
but any one or more theory might apply in any given case (Cartwright 1999). In political 
science, a ‘theory’ in this sense will typically be a causal model or mechanism. In a 
complementary vein, scientific explanation is not taken to require universal laws; instead, 
explanation requires only causal relations, whose scope may sometimes be very local 
(Woodward 2003). 
 
Theory development consists in the expansion and refinement of this toolbox. This 
expansion and refinement cannot be done in an empirical vacuum: by applying models 
from the toolbox to real cases, we both sharpen our sense of when a particular model is 
likely to be applicable, and also sharpen the model itself by learning from experience 
what aspects of it gain empirical traction (Ylikoski 2019). Such work is essential. 
Insulation from empirical application is seriously harmful.18 
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Many times, models from the toolbox are putatively wide-scope. Does this vitiate the 
conclusion that explanations in political science are usually narrow-scope? No, because 
even if a model is wide-scope, it may still deliver an explanation that is true of only a few 
cases, i.e. that is narrow-scope. It is true that contextual-historical work inevitably draws 
on background knowledge, and this background knowledge may in turn draw on wide-
scope theory. But any explanation is a particular combination of such knowledge, and 
may apply only narrowly. 
 
Because a given toolbox model typically applies only to some or a few cases in a sample, 
the use of large-n statistical methods that assume otherwise is problematized. I cannot do 
full justice to this issue here. But it is a mistake, for example, to use a statistical 
regression to test simplistically whether a toolbox model ‘is confirmed’ in a sample as a 
whole. 
 
Within the toolbox view, there is an important distinction between two ways in which a 
model leads to an explanation. On the causalist view, relations between terms in a model 
correspond to causal relations in the world, and so causal explanations can be read 
directly off the model, at least in successful cases. On the rival heuristicist view, the role 
of a model is more indirect. A model or models may helpfully suggest new categories or 
lines of enquiry to explore, but supplementary empirical work is required to develop an 
eventual causal hypothesis that is not itself derivable from the model or models. It is this 
eventual causal hypothesis that furnishes the explanation. The original model or models 
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are not themselves tested; instead, the demand for testing is transferred to the eventual 
causal hypothesis.19 
 
When should we adopt a causalist view and when a heuristicist one? The less idealized 
and the more contextual a model, the more likely it is we can read off actual causes from 
it directly, and so the more likely it is that a causalist view is appropriate. And the more 
contextual a model, the more likely that an explanation derived from it is narrow-scope. 
Explanations achieved via the heuristicist route, meanwhile, are usually narrow-scope 
too, because of the reliance on contextual empirical investigation over and above the 
original (typically wide-scope) model. Either way, usually we end up with explanations 
that are narrow-scope, in accordance with Thesis 3. 
 
In summary so far: because of underdetermination and causal fragility, and because both 
experiments and accurate forward-looking prediction are difficult, investigation in field 
sciences should usually be contextual-historical. Explanations are usually narrow-scope 
(sections 2 to 7). This tells against theories understood as applying everywhere. But it 
does not tell against theories understood as per the toolbox view, which are endorsed so 
long as they are not developed in isolation from empirical application. In this way, there 
is still a role for theory, for scientists usefully to develop it, and for cross-contextual 
scientific achievement.  
 
 
9. An exemplar of theory at work: della Porta on political violence 
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Donatella della Porta’s Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State (1995) is a 
highly influential study of political violence in 1960s and 1970s Italy and Germany.20 It 
is well known for, among other things, emphasizing the non-ideological determinants of 
violent actors’ behaviors. Della Porta’s primary goal is well-evidenced causal 
explanations and to this end she adopts, in effect, a contextual-historical approach.  
Despite this, her book is famous for being innovative theoretically. How so? Like game-
changing work in history and field sciences generally, she provides new categories and 
outlooks that successors are obliged to consider. A bedrock of her approach is 
explanatory pluralism, by which she means a willingness to incorporate multiple 
theoretical approaches, and to add new ones of her own, whenever these pay their way by 
enabling new causal explanations to be identified.21 This is the toolbox view in action.  
 
For example, what explains the behavior of violent groups? Some previous work focused 
on broad sociological determinants, such as the scope within a polity for expression of 
political frustrations; other previous work focused on rational-choice explanations of 
what tactics might best achieve a group’s ideological goals. Della Porta deviates from 
both of these. She examines organizational dynamics at the group rather than society 
level, and even though those dynamics are ‘irrational’ in the sense of not being driven by 
the groups’ ostensible ideological goals (1995, 116-33). Her analysis begins with arrests 
by police. These arrests disproportionately weaken those groups that are organized 
loosely, creating a selection effect in favor of groups that are more centralized and 
compartmentalized. This leads to reduced recruitment, and so to subsequent evolution 
becoming dominated by internal factors. Targets are chosen to achieve internal goals 
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such as discipline or self-defense (robberies, shoot-outs during arrests, punishment of 
‘traitors’) rather than, as earlier, external goals such as propaganda or campaigning 
(actions against unpopular factories or businesses). The emphasis on self-defense rather 
than recruitment leads to tactics becoming increasingly lethal and bloody. Ideology 
evolves accordingly, becoming decreasingly comprehensible to outsiders, with less 
emphasis on propaganda for external consumption and more emphasis on internal 
integration. The more underground and sealed off a group becomes, finally, the less 
effectively it influences wider society, because of its isolation. 
 
The toolbox approach informs all of della Porta’s book. Throughout, theory is developed 
and sharpened via detailed empirical engagement with her Italy and Germany case 
studies. One fruitful new category of hers is the policing of protests (1995, 56). Policing 
tactics serve as a downstream proxy for deeper state factors and institutional features, 
such as police organization, the nature of the judiciary, law codes, and constitutional 
rights. This simplifies the empirical tracking of the state’s influence on the (already 
theorized) ‘political opportunity structure’, because the connection between policing and 
social movements is conveniently direct. It also enables policing itself to be analyzed in a 
subtler way than before. Policing tactics became more hardline often not because of 
internal dynamics within the police but rather because of external political decisions 
(which the police tried to resist), contrary to much previous theory (1995, 77-8). Other 
political explanations too are revealed or supported. Examples include (1995, 76-8): how 
hardline state and police attitudes rose and fell with the attitude and strength of the 
moderate ‘old left’; how political polarization strengthened the hand of hardliners on both 
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sides; how, in the long run, hardliners declined in influence; and how the tactics of the 
protestors influenced the tactics of the police.  
 
This rich explanatory detail is made visible by Della Porta’s theoretical innovations. Her 
theories are not formal models; rather, they are qualitative and verbal. Her use of these 
theories is often heuristicist rather than causalist, bringing into view new categories or 
ways of seeing things rather than specifying causal hypotheses directly.22  
 
Della Porta is explicitly against the possibility of universal theory or wide-scope 
explanation (1995, 210). ‘Political violence’ and ‘radicalism’ enter into causal relations 
that are fragile. These causal relations vary with: leftist versus rightist protest 
movements; democratic versus authoritarian political environments; class versus ethnic 
bases; and different organizational models, forms of action, and ideologies and goals. 
Large-n studies would fatally gloss over these heterogeneities, and so would miss many 
causal explanations. The implicit aim of such large-n studies, namely to confirm or 
discover a wide-scope causal generalization, is futile in this domain (1995, 14-20). Della 
Porta takes her own explanations to apply only to leftist, class-based groups in a 
democratic environment. At the end of her book, she cautiously examines how well these 
explanations might transfer to the case of the ethnically based civil rights movement in 
1960s and 1970s USA. Again, detailed empirical engagement is the only way to tell 
(1995, 210-15). 
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10. Policy advice 
Policy advice is inevitably (in part) forward-looking. Therefore, it requires forward-
looking prediction, yet in field sciences forward-looking prediction is difficult. Does this 
imply a counsel of despair? Not always. 
 
To warrant an intervention, we require a confirmed causal model. There are two routes to 
that. The first route is induction: perhaps the most convincing warrant for forward-
looking predictive confidence is past forward-looking predictive success, combined with 
confidence that the context is sufficiently stable. At the macro level, such as predicting 
civil wars, the predictive record in political science is disappointing (Tetlock 2005, Ward 
et al 2010). This mandates caution, except when there is a record of success.  
 
The second route to predictive confidence is local knowledge. Combined with relevant 
background knowledge, local knowledge can warrant forward-looking predictions when 
it is detailed enough to establish that there are few significant unmodelled causes, that 
there is sufficient causal stability, and that outcomes are predictable at all in the sense of 
not being too sensitive to unknowable details (Sterelny 2016).23 This route obviously 
favors local-level predictions. For example, local knowledge may warrant a confident 
prediction of who will win an election in a particular new district, even if at the national 
level the election result is in doubt.  
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Generally, we should expect warranted interventions usually to be narrow-scope. This is 
because they require confirmed causal knowledge, which we should expect usually to be 
narrow-scope for the same reasons that causal explanations are. 
 
 
11. Conclusion 
There is hope, but only via empirical success. Usually, that means via contextual history 
or via forward-looking prediction. Usually, it also means narrow-scope explanations, and 
not seeking to confirm wide-scope explanations via retrospective prediction. Warrant for 
policy interventions will usually be narrow-scope too. 
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1 My focus in this paper is on epistemological rather than ideological or political 
considerations. 
2 By ‘field sciences’ I mean non-laboratory investigations of systems that are not 
engineered artefacts. 
3 Dowding and Miller’s distinction between scientific and non-scientific prediction is 
fruitful. (They label non-scientific prediction ‘pragmatic’.) As they note, within 
philosophy of science this distinction was noted by Popper (1989), among others. See 
also Salmon (1981) and Watkins (1968). 
4 Exactly how we should individuate ‘cases’ here is no doubt itself contextual. 
5 There is a literature on the relation between causal and structural or functional 
explanations. I do not discuss it here. 
6 Not all explanations are derived from models (section 8), but the points in the text carry 
over mutatis mutandis. 
7 Howson and Urbach (1993) and Worrall (2014), among others, give formal Bayesian 
demonstrations of this point. A similar conclusion can be demonstrated in non-Bayesian 
ways too. 
8 At least for the most part. The advantage is epistemic and contingent rather than 
logically necessary. But, while there are cases in which forward-looking prediction is not 
favored, in political science it usually is. 
9 A recent movement in political science seeks to prioritize forward-looking prediction 
(see Dowding and Miller 2019 for references). As per section 2, I agree with Dowding 
and Miller that forward-looking prediction should in addition be scientific. 
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10 Formally, this is a version of the no-plausible-alternatives solution, but now with 
respect to an augmented body of evidence. 
11 Formally, such gathering of additional evidence enables retrospective scientific 
prediction because the additional evidence can be used to test one explanation against 
another. 
12 See (Northcott 2012, 2013) for the relevant sense of partial explanation. 
13 This is true even if the causal relations in a model are wide-scope. A causal model 
being wide-scope does not imply that those causal relations are wide-scope in the world, 
nor that an explanation derived from the model is wide-scope (section 8). 
14 It is because field environments are typically noisy that simple prediction is typically 
not scientific: simple prediction takes account of the impact on Y not just of X but also of 
A, B, and C. 
15 The GDP model’s wide-scope prediction is not empirically confirmed in the particular 
case. Because of noise and causal fragility, this is the frequent fate of wide-scope 
predictions. In principle, evidence collected across many elections could favor some 
wide-scope models over others, thus alleviating underdetermination. But this method 
would have to assume that the relevant causal structures are stable across many elections, 
which is dubious. 
16 Another way to see the same point: noise means that any empirically accurate 
explanation is likely multi-factor. Any multi-factor explanation is more likely than a 
single-factor explanation to be narrow-scope, because it contains more factors (and 
interactions between them) that are potentially sensitive to a change in context. 
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17 This may well not be mere coincidence: sciences whose causal relations are stable have 
more to gain from investigating via laboratory experiments. But I do not explore that 
suggestion here. 
18 A common criticism of orthodox economic theory is precisely that it has been 
developed too remotely from empirical application (Northcott 2018, Northcott and 
Alexandrova 2015, Farmer 2013). Some strands of theory in political science may be 
vulnerable to the same criticism. 
19 The heuristicist view was originally inspired by cases of successful auctions in which 
the eventual auction mechanism is not derived, or derivable, from auction theory alone, 
but rather requires extensive supplementary experimental and practical development 
(Alexandrova 2008, Alexandrova and Northcott 2009). 
20 Over 1500 citations, according to Google Scholar. 
21 Della Porta employs mixed methods in a similar spirit. Individual actors’ life histories, 
in the form of qualitative analysis of interviews, form part of her evidence base; she uses 
various quantitative data too, for instance about the number of acts of violence; in 
addition, she uses archival research, such as consultation of official records. These 
various forms of evidence each pay their way by supporting particular causal inferences 
in the service of della Porta’s larger explanatory ambitions. 
22 ‘Recent studies on social movements provide the main categories for the explanatory 
model of political violence in Italy and Germany that I am going to develop here.’ (Della 
Porta 1995, 9, emphasis added) 
23 There is principled reason to expect predictability to require local knowledge. The 
literature on the extrapolation of a model from one context to another, including from the 
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past to the future, concurs that such extrapolation requires detailed knowledge of the 
target context (Cartwright 2019, Khosrowi 2019, Cartwright and Hardie 2012). 
